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FUTURE CHILDREN AS PROPERTY
CARTER DILLARD*
Between Skinner v. Oklahoma and the advent of modern substantive due process,
procreation, at least in the eyes of many courts and commentators, became entrenched as
a fundamental, if not absolute, right. And yet ironically, the establishment of this right,
often taken as symbolic of personal liberty, has diminished autonomy for those persons
inevitably caught on the other end of it – our future children. Expanding procreative
autonomy has diminished public norms that might otherwise ensure that future children
are born into circumstances that also expand their autonomy. Instead, the broad,
modern, privacy-based version of the right to procreate leaves the matter exclusively and
privately to the whims of prospective parents, allowing them to create any number of
children in any manner of circumstances. This tends to institutionalize the
classification of a group of persons, albeit future persons, who exist morally and legally
though not yet physically, as property. It does so because it gives prospective parents
exclusive and absolute power over members of the class; power to freely access them, use
them, and determine their future relations, and to do so in exclusion of others’ power,
including the constructive power of the members themselves. This power over future
children, which the privacy-based right to procreate vests in prospective parents, is the
unmistakable hallmark of one class of persons treating another as property.
This article maintains that the most common notion of the right to procreate, the
one seemingly derived from constitutional precedent and today taken as largely beyond
question, tends to treat future children largely as a class of property, assigned as such to
prospective parents. This article also traces the historical development of the right as
part of the larger tradition of treating existing children as the property of those who
create them. Throughout, this article suggests that the right to procreate so conceived is
in tension with an embedded constitutional principle that prohibits one class of persons
from treating another as property. This tension, which may be called the “property
objection,” demands that we change the way we think about the right to procreate.
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INTRODUCTION
Near the middle of the twentieth century, after the Supreme Court had
decided both Skinner v. Oklahoma1 and Buck v. Bell,2 the nature of the right to
procreate – at least as it was protected under the United States Constitution –
was relatively undetermined.
While Skinner overturned a statute that
authorized the involuntary sterilization of convicted felons, it merely
distinguished itself from Buck, which fifteen years earlier had upheld a similar
statute for “mental defectives.”3 Skinner also made clear that the reason the
sterilization statute was unconstitutional was because it, unlike the statute in
Buck, conspicuously and arbitrarily exempted “‘offenses arising out of the
violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political
offenses’”4 and because “strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a sterilization law is essential.”5
At that time, with all of the questions Skinner and Buck left unanswered,
there was still ample room for the Court to articulate in detail the contours of an
unenumerated right to procreate.
Today, after decades filled with modern substantive due process
jurisprudence establishing the fundamental right not to procreate, (e.g., the right
to obtain and use contraception, or to terminate one’s pregnancy) it is largely
accepted that the right to have or to not have children is part of a broad liberty
or privacy-based right, or as Laurence Tribe put it, “whether one person’s body
shall be the source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to
decide.”6 How did this shift, from the gap left by Skinner and Buck to the
comprehensive modern broad notion of the right, come about?
This brief exploratory article starts by providing one account, describing
how in 1961, with Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman,7 the Court began to
rewrite Skinner by tying its narrow holding to the broader notions of personal
liberty and familial privacy that first appeared in cases decided decades before
Skinner. If Skinner is the seminal precedent for modern substantive due process,8
it is only because it has been rewritten to serve that purpose, and fused with a
longer line of precedent implicating a broad range of cherished values beyond
the right to have children.
But, having established how the shift occurred, the point of this article is to
make the following critique of the broad notion of the right Tribe and others

1. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (invalidating a statute permitting involuntary
sterilization of certain convicted felons on narrow equal protection grounds).
2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (upholding a statute permitting involuntary
sterilization of institutionalized persons).
3. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538, 542.
4. Id. at 537, 541-42. .
5. Id. at 541.
6. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1340 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omitted).
7. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)
8. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 6667 (1990).
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describe: that notion of the right, which treats the act of having a child as a
matter of personal liberty or familial privacy, is problematic from a liberal
perspective because it tends to treat a class of persons, prospective children, as
property. It does so because it gives prospective parents exclusive and absolute
power (in a Hohfeldian sense)9 over members of the class: power to freely access
them, use them, and determine their future relations, and to do so in exclusion
of others’ power, including the constructive power of the members themselves.
This notion of the right is also legally problematic because it is in tension with a
constitutional principle that prohibits one class of persons from treating another
as property.
In dealing with the right to procreate one could simply focus on policy
prescriptions that maximize autonomy between parents and their future
children (and of course it can be maximized for both, e.g., a law which funds a
program to gently nudge teens not to become pregnant can enhance their
autonomy and that of the class of their future children). However, this article
does not take an express position on what laws a state should or should not pass
with regard to procreation.
Rather, its thesis is that when particular laws are challenged as
unconstitutional because they allegedly violate the right to procreate under
Skinner, we ought not to construct the defensive right so as to give the
prospective parent exclusive power to determine the circumstances in which he or
she has a child because that reading of the right wrongly treats future children
as the property of their prospective parents. We may call this claim the
“property objection.”
The objection might be applied in a variety of cases. For example, in the
recent case of In re Bobbijean P,10 the New York Court of Appeals reviewed a
family court case in which the lower court issued a temporary probation order
which obligated the parents, who had been determined to be unfit and had lost
custody of their children as a result, not to procreate further until they had reobtained custody and care of Bobbijean P as well as their other three children
who were in foster care.11
While the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the order and instead determined that the lower court had
exceeded its statutory authority,12 the case falls into a line of cases throughout
the country in which “no procreation” orders issued to criminally unfit parents
whose future children would be seized by the state at birth because the parents
are legally unfit to care for them have been challenged as violating the

9. Regarding power, and the other constituent elements of legal rights generally, see Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J.
16, 23-24 (1913). For Hohfeld, a power is “an ability to cause, by an act of one's own, an alteration in
a person's rights, either one's own rights or those of another person or persons, or both.” JUDITH
JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 57 (1990).
10. In re Bobbijean, 842 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (App. Div. 2007) (“[T]he court should have granted
respondent's motion because it had no authority to impose the ‘no pregnancy’ condition.”).
11. Id. at 827.
12. Id. at 828.
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constitutional right to procreate.13 Courts have split on whether the orders
violate the constitutional right, but the cases present an opportunity to examine
whether the right should be read as to protect prospective parents’ exclusive
and absolute power over members of the class of their future children, so much
so that they can create children into neglectful and abusive circumstances where
the law literally forbids the future children to be. Is the exclusive power vested
by the Constitution so great that it trumps the parental power, so that a
prospective parent has a claim-right of noninterference to have a child, in the
sense of procreating, but not to have a child, in the sense of retaining custody of
it? In what sense does this give prospective parents a property-like right to use
their prospective children, via an absolutely exclusive power to freely determine
those children’s future moral, legal, and proprietary relations?
Part I of this article begins with an analogous story of people treating other
people as property, setting the stage with Barbara Bennett-Woodhouse’s tale of
how Meyer v. Nebraska14 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,15 two “liberal icons” from
the 1920s, established in constitutional jurisprudence the notion of a private
familial realm. These cases are at the heart of the modern substantive due
process law that allows parents broad control over their children and also which
followed and entrenched in the Constitution a tradition of allowing fathers to
treat their living children as property. This part then shows how the broad
notion of the right to procreate was drawn from this tradition, when nineteen
years after it was decided, the Court began to rewrite the holding in Skinner,
weaving the case into the earlier Meyer and Pierce line, though the Court in
Skinner never cited those cases and also made clear that the only reason the
sterilization statute before it was unconstitutional was because it was arbitrarily
discriminatory.
Part II argues that a broad, liberty and privacy-based notion of the right to
procreate tends to treat prospective children, as a class, as the property of their
prospective parents. Part II(A) begins with a description of the right and its
Hohfeldian structure, and then turns in Part II(B) to a description of the class of
persons I refer to as prospective children. Part II(C) explains what it means for
one class of persons to have property in another, and Part II(D) describes the
power prospective parents exercise over their prospective children in the act of
procreating. Part II(E) then demonstrates how the broad notion of the right
tends to treat prospective children as a class of property, by assigning them as
such to their prospective parents. Finally, Part III, surveys alternative notions of
the right which are less proprietary than the broad notion because they temper
the power of prospective parents against public norms that protect prospective
children, and base the right upon interests of prospective parents that are
themselves intrinsically limited.

13. See generally Carter J. Dillard, Child Welfare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367, 388-97
(2009) (noting several other cases where criminally unfit parents challenged no-procreation orders as
violations of their constitutional right to procreate).
14. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (finding unconstitutional a state ban on the
instruction of children in certain foreign languages).
15. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (finding unconstitutional a state law
eliminating parochial education in favor of mandatory public schooling).
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Arguing that a broad procreative right mistakenly treats prospective
children as property is not an entirely novel approach. In 1859 John Stuart Mill
argued that you do not maximize human autonomy by extending liberty to
family relations and treating the family as some autonomous province or
realm.16 Today, writing in the context of regulating the use of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs), legal scholars have at least asserted that
applying a broad right to procreate risks treating children, as well as potential
children, as property.17 Also, scholars like Joel Feinberg,18 and later Alicia
Ouelette and Dena Davis,19 have argued that all children have the right to an
“open future” which places a duty on prospective parents not to treat their
prospective children as a non-consenting means to the parents’ end.
This of course has the flavor of a property objection. However, these
arguments are debatably more Kantian than constitutional.
And more
generally, while some in the ART debates seem to question the right to
procreate, it does not seem that they would carry their arguments beyond
regulating the use of ART. The theorists instead seem to be concerned with
whether ART use is simply to be treated differently.20
This article’s approach is unique because it expands this discussion well
beyond the context of ART, and applies a new variation of the property
objection to the right to procreate in general. As such, this article’s claim
regarding treating children as property diverges from the current debates
substantially, but nevertheless adds to the literature that has developed around
them.
First, the class of persons that I am concerned with is temporally removed
from the pre-embryos and other sorts of physical things the ART debates often
focus on. Prospective children, as I define them in Part II(B), exist somewhere
between the remote future generations that seem to be of such interest to
environmental law scholars, and conception (which I will assume, only for this
argument’s sake, occurs somewhere between the production of specific gametes
16. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 103 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978)
(1859).
17. See e.g., Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1990. As is discussed below, this argument is distinct from the
claim that a woman’s right to choose to abort a fetus gives the woman property rights over a
prospective child.
18. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 309-10 (2008).
19.
The parent who seeks to add, delete, modify, or substitute a genetic trait in the potential
child for their own social, aesthetic, or cultural reasons has treated the potential child as a
property to be molded, or a tool by which they can advance their own conception of the
good life. Treating a child, even a potential child, as a tool causes moral harm.
Alicia R. Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky’s Call for Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 403-04 (2008); see also Dena S.
Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 567 (1997) (“I
maintain that liberalism requires us to intervene to support the child's future ability to make its own
choices about which of the many diverse visions of life it wishes to embrace.”).
20. See e.g., Emily Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, 65 MOD. L. REV.
176, 182 (2002) (premising her argument on values that she views as supporting a broad coital
procreative right, and that should extend to ART-based procreation).
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and fertilization). The scope of the class is defined by the temporal point of
conception on one side and the advent of actual future people (as opposed to
merely possible people) on the other.21 This then is before the point at which
most ART debates begin.22 One area of the ART debates that seems to deal with
prospective children involves the commodification of future children.23 But the
debate there inevitably shifts its focus towards living children (the execution of a
surrogacy contract, for example) or the commodification of women’s bodies,
rather than dealing with the sale of prospective children per se.24 For example,
one commentator takes on the issue of parents intentionally having a child to
use as an organ donor for the child’s sibling.25 But rather than asking whether
doing so treats a member of the prospective-child class as property, her focus is
on regulation of the organ donation once the prospective child is born. Instead
of focusing on body parts or living children, this article has a temporal focus on
the relationship between prospective children and prospective parents, under
the traditional notion of the right to procreate.
Secondly, this article is primarily a critique of a particular reading of
constitutional precedent, rather than a fully-theorized prescription for a specific
legislative or regulatory regime or for modification of current tort or contract
law, to regulate surrogacy or ARTs for example.26
Thirdly, this article does not deal with market transactions directly, which
are often the impetus behind the ART debates,27 for example in Margaret Jane
Radin’s work on surrogacy.28 The exclusion-based notion of property that I
work with in the pages below is probably a necessary stick in the bundle that
precedes salability. But this article challenges the right of prospective parents to
exclude, and as such I never get to market transactions. The claim in this article,
in contrast, might be raised by a state defending surrogacy regulation treating
certain contracts as void ab initio against a constitutional privacy attack, on the
grounds that deriving a privacy-based right to procreate from the constitution is

21. See, MELINDA A ROBERTS, Child versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in
Ethics and the Law 2 (1988) (distinguishing between classes of persons based on their degree of
prospectivity).
22. See e.g., Note, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005).
23. See, e.g. I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the
Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003) (neatly summarizing the sea of literature in this
area).
24. See, e.g., Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1921-37 (1987);
Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305 (1995).
25. See Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal, Using Scientific Advances to Conceive the “Perfect” Donor: The
Pandora's Box of Creating Child Donors for the Purpose of Saving Ailing Family Members, 32 SETON HALL
L. REV. 583, 599-616 (2002).
26. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008) (arguing that tort liability should not be banned where parents pre-select
embryos to create disabled children); June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining
the Validity of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581 (1988) (outlining why contracts have
not been used as models for family relationships, and the resulting difficulties involved in the
enforcement of surrogacy contracts).
27. See Cohen, supra note 23.
28. See Radin, supra note 24 .
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impermissible because it treats future children as property. The property
objection might also complicate areas in the related population debates, for
example, with regard to the recent proposal for a population policy based on
tradable procreation entitlements.29
Regardless, the property objection will have consequences for the
commodification debate. There are powerful political and economic interests,
like the fertility and related industries in the U.S. and elsewhere, that profit from
a privacy-based version of reproductive rights. Only when prospective parents
believe they have exclusive and unfettered freedom of choice over the class of
their future children can these industries manipulate that free choice and shape
it into market preference so that prospective parents consume the products and
services those industries sell. Often the real parties in interest behind the notion
of broad procreative freedom are not the would-be parents at all, and we should
always consider who actually benefits from the version of reproductive rights
that leads to cases like that of Nadya Suleman,30 the so-called “Octomom” who
had octuplets after receiving fertility treatments, though she already had six
other young children at home and was receiving public assistance.
Finally, this article is a legal critique based on one notion of the
constitutional right to procreate, rather than the exclusively moral or ethical
critique of various possible ART fact-patterns, or of actions that harm the
environment, which often frame the discussions of future persons. As such the
claim in this article is not subject to what has been called the non-identity
problem,31 which refers to the difficulty of showing that we harm future persons
in creating them, because had they not been created (in even objectionable
circumstances) they would not have existed at all. First, the claim I make here
refers to the class of future children, rather than individual future children,
which are at the heart of the non-identity problem. Also, this claim is not
contingent on showing harm to particular future children, but rather is an
objection to how their fate is decided.
This article thus adds to the literature that exists regarding the right to
procreate. The ART debate takes place within a larger and unquestioned moral
and constitutional framework. We can back out of those debates to a relatively
high level of abstraction to consider that framework, or how two fundamental
constitutional principles – the notion of a personal or private realm free of state
interference, and the obligation that we not treat others as property – conflict. I
believe that rather than fitting ART into our current reproductive rights
paradigm, we should use it as a reason to change that paradigm.
Moreover, we could easily fit the claim advanced in this article within the
current ART debates. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky argues against tort liability for
parents who intentionally select pre-embryos with disabling traits (like
29. See David De la Crois & Axel Gosseries, Population Policy through Tradable Procreation
Entitlements, 2 (Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working
Paper 2007-62 2007), available at http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2007-62.pdf.
30. Ellen Goodman, The Ethical Failures of Fertility Treatment, Boston Globe, February 6, 2009,
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/02/06/
the_ethical_failures_of_fertility_treatment/.
31. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive
Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 381-83 (1999).
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deafness), based primarily on the moral grounds of the non-identity problem, or
what is also known as the problem of contingent future persons.32 She focuses
on the lack of reasons to find the parents at fault and hence liable, after finding
that there is no constitutional right – either of parental control or bodily integrity
– barring such suits. This article will take the position that, while we might find
parents morally at fault for intentionally selecting pre-embryos with disabling
traits because doing so may treat members of a class of persons as property, it
should also be recognized that the constitution should not be read as protecting
such behavior as a matter of privacy for the very same reason.
Despite the alternative notions of the right to procreate surveyed in Part III,
it will be vital to keep in mind that this article is more diagnostic and critical
(describing a problematic logical consequence of one view of the right) than
prescriptive. It is a critique of one reading of a constitutional right, rather than a
prescription for an alternative right, or for a scheme of norms to regulate
procreation. In that sense this article is more about process, and the question of
who (other than the prospective parent) should determine the interests of future
children, than the substance of what those interests should be.
This critique of the broad notion of the right to procreate (a notion which
seems liberal) is based on the claim that this reading actually has illiberal
consequences – consequences that put it in tension with the Constitution.
Consider the extent to which the Reconstruction Era amendments confirmed
what we might call a substantive maxim of constitutional interpretivism,33 or a
substantive constitutional “commitment,”34 which forbids reading the
Constitution (and most certainly those amendments) as granting a fundamental
right to one class of persons to treat another class of persons (even temporally
disadvantaged people like prospective children) as property.35 Arguably, the
Reconstruction Era amendments, particularly the Thirteenth, embedded in the
Constitution a principle of moral repugnance for persons treating other persons
as property, so that whatever notion of the right to procreate we wish to develop
by looking back on cases developing the right to procreate, or forward towards
what right is most justified, it cannot violate that principle.
More
32. See Smolensky, supra note 18, at 331-36.
33. Regarding Dworkin’s interpetivism generally, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
Dworkin has applied his method to the relationship between the Constitution and slavery, perhaps
most eloquently in his condemnation of the Fugitive Slave Cases. See, e.g., Kenneth Eimar Himma,
Trouble in Law's Empire: Rethinking Dworkin's Third Theory of Law, 23 O.J.L.S. 345, 350 (2003)
(discussing Dworkin’s method of fit and justification in the context of slavery, and Dworkin’s view
that “the general structure of the American Constitution presupposed a conception of individual
freedom antagonistic to slavery”).
34. James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 233 (1993)
(arguing that theorists like Laurence Tribe, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman and Cass Sunstein
point to constitutional provisions like the Thirteenth Amendment as evidence of substantive norms
or “commitments” embedded in the Constitution).
35. Ronald Dworkin might also be read as endorsing a broad right to procreate, or the principle
that he calls “the right of procreative autonomy.” See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 102 (1996).
However, in his discussion on this point, he is concerned with state limitations on the use of
contraceptives and abortion, which are based on the state’s view of the intrinsic value of life. Id. at
101-10. However, procreation is not the prevention of conception, or an act of abortion, and the
claim advanced in this article relies on the relative quality of the prospective child’s future life,
rather than taking as a given the value of life per se.
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conservatively, we could say that even if the amendments did not embed such a
principle generally, their structure should prohibit us from reading those
specific provisions – including the Fourteenth Amendment – so as to violate the
principle. If we must derive the constitutional right to procreate from the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would be bizarre, in light of the history of that
amendment, to do it in a way that also created property rights in persons.
Read broadly, that principle of not treating others as property would mean
that the broad notion of the right to procreate is not only illiberal, but also
forbidden by the Constitution. As such, the property objection goes well
beyond the many arguments that would have us simply doubt that the common,
broad, privacy-based notion of the right can be derived from the Constitution. If
the property objection holds true, that common notion of the right to have
children is not only unsupportable, but morally problematic and constitutionally
prohibited.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE
Before delving into the privacy or liberty-based approach to the right to
procreate, it is helpful to understand Barbara Bennett Woodhouse’s discussion
of how parental rights tend to treat existing children as property.36 There are
more comprehensive sources for the proposition that children were historically
treated as the property of their fathers,37 and there is a persuasive body of
commentary showing that the Supreme Court, in cases like Troxel v. Granville,38
still views children as the property of their parents.39
But Wodhouse’s genius is to show that the law continues to treat children
in this manner because this attitude towards children determined, in large part,
how the foundational cases concerning parental rights — cases upon which
modern substantive due process is built — were decided.
Woodhouse offers a compelling revisionist history of Meyer and Pierce, two
“liberal icons” which established the freedom to control one’s children’s
education and which have become sine qua non for the proposition that there
exists a constitutional sanctuary from state meddling populated by
unenumerated rights, the best image of which is the family realm. She argues
that these cases “announced a dangerous form of liberty, the right to control
another human being,”40 and that they were animated by
a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-stratified society,
and to a parent’s private property rights in his children and their labor. Along
with protecting religious liberty and intellectual freedom, Meyer and Pierce

36. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
37. See e.g., MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHERS’ PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (1996).
38. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 55-58 (2000) (plurality concluding parents have a right to
exercise broad parental authority over the lives of their minor children); see also Earl M. Maltz, The
Trouble with Troxel, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 695 (2001).
39. One might simply argue that if, as a historical matter, existing children are viewed as
property it certainly follows that future children – who might be harder to empathize with due to
their temporal disadvantage – would be as well.
40. See Woodhouse, supra note 36 at 1001.
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constitutionalized a narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as essentially
private property. This vision continues to distort our family law and national
family policy, so that we fail as lawmakers to respect children and fail as a
nation to recognize and legitimate all American children as our own.41

Although focused on the constitutional doctrine ensuring parental control
of living children, Woodhouse’s plea for an alternative to child-as-property
thinking echoes Feinberg’s argument that all children, including prospective
children, deserve an open future. Woodhouse revealed the “dark side”42 of
substantive due process, by exposing the links between “economic due process
and family liberties [which] [b]oth grow from a Spencerian conviction that men
should be free to deploy their properties as they wish.”43
Woodhouse’s account is relevant to understanding how the law treats
prospective children as property because, as discussed below, beginning in 1961
Skinner’s holding was reconstructed and woven into the Meyer and Pierce line of
reasoning. In this way, the right to procreate has been made a matter of
personal or familial privacy. Just as Meyer and Pierce entrenched a proprietary
relationship between parents and their children, Skinner entrenched a
proprietary relationship between prospective parents and their prospective
children.
A close examination of the Skinner decision reveals that the rather
undefined right to procreate that it recognized in 1942 bears little resemblance to
the broad right articulated by Tribe and others today. Of course, Skinner was
not the first case to test the right, and in Skinner Justice Douglas merely
distinguished Buck,44 the only other Court case at the time dealing with the right.
More importantly, the Court narrowed its holding significantly, stating that
[s]everal objections to the constitutionality of the Act have been pressed upon
us . . . . We pass those points without intimating an opinion on them, for there is
a feature of the Act which clearly condemns it. That is, its failure to meet the
requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.45

What was the nature of the right to procreate after Skinner? Was it that the
mentally ill have no right to procreate while convicted felons do? Was it, under
a close reading of the language in Skinner, that it was not a matter of rights so
much as that limitations on the right to procreate must be distributed equally?46
Was it that the goal of limiting the right to procreate is constitutionally valid,

41. Woodhouse, supra note 36 at 997.
42. Id. at 1000-01 (noting that Meyer and Pierce enabled children’s “voicelessness, objectification,
and isolation”).
43. Id. at 1112.
44. Skinner v. Nebraska, 316 U.S. 535 at 542 (1947) (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
45. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537-38. Does use of strict scrutiny mean that Skinner nonetheless
assumed that procreation is a fundamental right? As the court stated, its reference to strict scrutiny
merely explained how it would go about equal protection analysis and does not automatically
indicate the existence of a fundamental right. Id. at 541.
46. See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1466 (2008) (noting that Skinner v. Oklahoma protects the “constitutional
right to be free from forced sterilization in large part because of fears regarding race and class-based
inequalities”).
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though the means of doing so are subject to review, and sterilization as a means
is never permissible? Was it that, in light of the fact that Carrie Buck had
procreated and Jack Skinner had apparently not, that sterilization is permissible
after one has procreated but not before?
These questions are never addressed by the Court because Skinner
eventually became precedent for and integral to the notion of a private family
realm. And though Skinner never cited Meyer or Pierce, nineteen years after it
was decided the Court began to weave the three cases together as evidence of a
broad realm of familial privacy, despite the Skinner Court’s attempts to limit its
holding to questions of equal protection and its preservation of Buck.
Among Supreme Court cases,47 Skinner was cited exclusively in the equal
protection context up until Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman48 in 1961.
Poe upheld a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives as applied
to married couples.49 Harlan dissented, finding that the contraception ban,
though unenforced, threatened a protected liberty, and that the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed a range of unenumerated rights.50
Harlan cited Skinner as recognizing “a rational continuum” of liberty,51 and for
the proposition that the statute involved a “most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’
the privacy of the home in its most basic sense, and it is this which requires the
statute to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny.’”52 He related this notion of the private
home to Meyer and Pierce because “[c]ertainly the safeguarding of the home does
not follow merely from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its preeminence as the seat of family life.”53
After Harlan’s dissent, the Court, in Reynolds v. Sims cited Skinner as an
example of the Court protecting a basic human right,54 and shortly thereafter, in
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court completely separated Skinner from its equal
protection holding, using it as an example of a fundamental right, and the

47. The California Supreme Court, and Justice Traynor, may have been the first to begin to tie
Skinner into the Meyer and Pierce realm. In Perez v. Lippold, a 1948 California Supreme Court case
invalidating a ban on interracial marriage, the court found that marriage is as fundamental a right as
the right to choose a child’s school (at issue in Meyer), or the right “to have offspring.” Perez v.
Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 714 (1948). “Indeed,” Justice Traynor writes, quoting Skinner, “‘[w]e are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.’” Id. at 713 (quoting
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541). After Griswold was decided, the court in People v. Belous cited Skinner, along
with Meyer and Pierce, as examples of its, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s, “repeated acknowledgment
of a ‘right of privacy’ or ‘liberty’ in matters related to marriage, family, and sex” from which follows
“[t]he fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children.” People v. Belous, 71
Cal.2d 954, 963 (1969).
48. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 509.
50. Id. at 553-55.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 548-49. The literature at this time was also taking the approach of relating the right to
bear children to Meyer and Pierce. See e.g., Note, Connecticut's Birth Control Law: Reviewing a State
Statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 YALE L.J. 322, 333 (1960).
53. Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
54. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (holding that the apportionment of
representation in state legislatures must be based on population rather than geographical area).
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foundation for the realm of familial privacy.55 This is especially clear in Justice
White’s concurrence in which he cites Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner as the three
opinions evidencing a “realm of family life which the state cannot enter”
without substantial justification.56
Griswold threaded the three opinions together, making it seem as though
the right of married couples to use contraception was merely part of a
longstanding and unbroken tradition of familial privacy going back to the
beginning of the century — a tradition that undoubtedly included the right to
procreate. If the notion of penumbral privacy was novel, it certainly seemed less
so when based upon the settled line of authority Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner was
said to establish. The Court and commentators, after Griswold, have continued
to use this broad privacy-based notion of the right, relying on the Meyer, Pierce
and Skinner line, despite Skinner’s narrow holding.57
The broad notion of the right as articulated by Tribe comes from this
tradition.58 Could the Court, rather than weaving it into the familial realm,
instead have articulated a different right, unenumerated, but with detailed
content regarding its scope, derivation, and relative weight? Contrast the right
to procreate as the broad notion states it, with the rich and complex right to
terminate one’s pregnancy that the Court has developed in the past several
decades.
Regardless of what might have happened, the broad notion of the right is
problematic. While one could take a more retrospective view and argue that
this broad notion of the right derives from property because it is based on the
sanctity of one’s home,59 this article argues instead that—–whatever its origins—
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a statute prohibiting the
use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it violated the right to privacy).
56. Id. at 495 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
57. For cases that rely on Meyer, Pierce and Skinner in regards to the right to conceive and raise
children, see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977); Hodgson
v. Minnesota , 497 U.S. 417, 447-48 (1990). For a discussion of the right’s evolution after Griswold see
Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 15-20 (2007).
Commentators followed suit, with little exception. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 931-32 n.79 (1973); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1422-23 (1974); G. Edward White, The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1212, 1235 n.92 (1976); John A. Siliciano, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State
Action After Danforth and Carey¸77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1216 n.6 (1977); Jan N. Holladay, Note, Due
Process Limitations on Parental Rights to Commit Children to Mental Health Institutions: Bartley v.
Kremens¸ 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 249 n. 82 (1977); Elizabeth S. MacMillan, Birth-Defective Infants: A
Standard for Non-treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599, 611 n.63 (1978); Randy A. Hertz, Retarded
Parents in Neglect Proceedings: The Erroneous Assumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV. 785,
793-94 (1979); but see Bruce Kafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy--Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 528-30 (1983).
58. Tribe implies this in articulating his view of privacy more generally. See TRIBE, supra note 6,
at 1414-15.
59. Kate Fletcher, who provided research and commentary in helping to develop this article,
suggests this possibility: that having and raising children is protected because it falls within the
sanctity of the home, and the sanctity of the home was derived from the concept of private property.
For example, Meyer refers to the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). But Meyer was not the first case to read the Fourteenth
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the broad notion has the consequence of acting like a property right by treating
prospective children as a class of property, assigned to their prospective parents
as such.
II. THE CLAIM: THE BROAD NOTION OF THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE TENDS TO TREAT
PROSPECTIVE CHILDREN AS PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES.

The success of the claim - that the broad notion of the right to procreate
tends to treat prospective children as property because it excludes others’ power
over members of that class and allows prospective parents free use of its
members - is contingent upon the plausibility of four initial premises: the broad
notion of the right to procreate,60 the existence of prospective children as a class,
a plausible description of what it means to treat persons as property, and an
understanding of the power (in a Hohfeldian sense) that having children entails.
A. The Broad Notion of the Right
Perhaps the best articulation of this notion, as well as evidence of its
widespread acceptance as a constitutional norm, is Tribe’s statement above,
which appears in his leading treatise American Constitutional Law. There, Tribe
argues that Skinner established the Constitution’s guarantee that “whether one
person’s body shall be the source of another life must be left to that person and that
person alone to decide.”61 And while this notion of the right differs from the
articulation in Skinner, it echoes the language of subsequent Court opinions that
reinterpreted and cited it as a foundation for and part of the modern
fundamental rights doctrine.62
The right so conceived is part of and justifies a realm that is walled off from
state intervention, and defends within its borders the individual’s or couple’s

Amendment as relating the sanctity of the home to broader familial privacy interests. The link
between family and private property can be found earlier in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885),
which dealt with unreasonable search and seizure. In that case, the Court relied largely on Entick v.
Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 St. Tr. 1029 (1765),
The principles laid down in [the Entick] opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employes [sic] of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.”
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630 (citing Entick, 19 St. Tr. at 1029).
60. For the purposes of this article, an act of procreation refers to any voluntary act taken by an
individual that is either one of the two most proximate causes of the conception of a future person or
persons, with such person or persons eventually being born. Note that Tribe’s notion of the right
bundles the right to procreate with the right not to procreate, conflating the two as part of a broader
notion. TRIBE, supra note 6, §§ 15-10, 15-20, 15-21.
61. See TRIBE, supra note 6. Tribe however argues that Skinner would not bar narrow and
nondiscriminatory measures (presumably subject to strict scrutiny), like those designed to prevent
overpopulation. Id.
62. See CARL WELLMAN, MEDICAL LAW AND MORAL RIGHTS 125-34 (2005).
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choice to procreate, or not procreate,63 as well as to engage in the other
behaviors at the core of modern substantive due process, like using
contraception and obtaining an abortion. Dorothy Roberts, relying heavily on
Tribe, finds that
[c]onsiderable support exists for the conclusion that the decision to procreate is
part of the right of privacy. The decision to bear children is universally
acknowledged in the privacy cases as being “at the very heart” of these
constitutionally protected choices. . . . The right of privacy protects equally the
choice to bear children and the choice to refrain from bearing them.64

Woven into the fabric of modern substantive due process, the right to
procreate is not just a matter of privacy, but also a matter of liberty because, as
John Robertson argues,
[r]eproductive decisions have such great significance for personal identity and
happiness that an important area of freedom and human dignity would be lost if
one lacked self-determination in procreation. Indeed, to deny the importance of
procreative liberty would be to grant the state repressive power over our
intimate lives in a most fundamental way, as recent experiences in China and
Romania have shown.65

And, if we consider the relative absence of state interference with
procreation in the United States, that is, not just the theoretical line drawn onto
the Constitution that the state cannot cross but also the absence of legal reasons
not to procreate, this realm of privacy and liberty seems an apt notion of the
right. It is broad in terms of the behavior it protects and, absent unusual
situations like being incarcerated, it seems almost to guarantee a place to which
we can retreat to make others like us, free from the state’s gaze and influence.
Some have argued that the broad right should include the right to have as many
children as one wants,66 to have another child after the state has seized its

63. See, e.g. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1467 (1991) (“Burdening both the right to
terminate a pregnancy and the right to give birth to a child violates a woman's personhood by
denying her autonomy over the self-defining decision of whether she will bring another being into
the world.”); but see I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1135, 1141 (2008) (“American constitutional jurisprudence appears to treat the right to be and not to
be a gestational parent (still in the non-interference sense) as conjoined. But this bundling is not
inherent.” (footnote omitted)). Elsewhere I critique the foundation of this way of thinking about the
right, arguing that it is a serious conceptual error to think of procreation as a private or personal act
because its necessary and sufficient condition is the creation of a third person. It is thus thoroughly
and unavoidably interpersonal. Along these lines of thought, one could argue that procreation is
more akin to an act of speech or expression than it is to abortion. Grouping it in with the latter
might be mere associative thinking.
64. Roberts, supra note 63, at 1465-66 (footnotes omitted).
65. John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to my Critics, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 236 (1995).
66. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1996) (”[M]any
advocates of coercive family planning see merit in the personal right to decide freely how many
children to have.”); cf. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(“Men and women in America are free to have children, as many as they desire. They may do so
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siblings to protect them, to clone oneself, or to genetically select for disabling
traits in the children we will have.
It is also a weighty right, which according to some should enjoy primacy
when conflicts with other rights or interests arise67 because, arguably, “[f]ew
decisions that people make are more personal than these, in the sense that what
is the best choice depends on people’s own personal aims and values, or more
far-reaching in their impact on people’s lives.”68 The Supreme Court, in dicta
spun from the Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner line, has reinforced this notion,
guaranteeing, as it did in Carey v. Population Services International, that “decisions
whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most private.”69
While no constitutional right is absolute, under this notion the right to
procreate – protected as it is within the privacy or liberty-based realm – has no
evident limits. As one dissenting justice said regarding a case involving a father
of nine who refused to pay child support, and who was ordered not to have
more children until he was no longer in arrears, “[m]en and women in America
are free to have children, as many as they desire. They may do so without the
means to support the children and may later suffer legal consequences as a
result of the inability to provide support.”70
In Hohfeld’s terms,71 this bundled “right” to procreate generally represents
for the procreator a cluster of more elemental rights: a liberty to have children
(or a lack of a duty not to procreate), a claim-right to the constitutional duty the
state owes not to interfere with having children, as well as a constitutional
immunity from the state’s altering the liberty or claim-right. Together, these
elements define the essential legal relations between the would-be parent and
the state. However, the right also entails a host of other relations, such as the
special liabilities of co-procreators, existing family members, and other persons
who will legally associate with the child when born. There are many more
relations that could be mentioned here, but most importantly the right involves
a unique form of power-right (or “power”) over the would-be parents’
prospective children, which is discussed in Part II(D) and is the focus of this
article.
As one might imagine, there are those who today challenge this broad
conception of the right, and whether it can be thought of as synonymous with
privacy.72 But it may have been J.S. Mill who first realized the contradiction
without the means to support the children and may later suffer legal consequences as a result of the
inability to provide support.”).
67. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 65, at 24 (“Procreative liberty should enjoy presumptive
primacy when conflicts about its exercise arise because control over whether one reproduces or not
is central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one's life.”).
68. See WELLMAN, supra note 62, at 141 (quoting D.W. Brock, Reproductive freedom: It’s nature,
basis, and limits, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PROFESSIONALS 49 (D. Thomasma and
J. Monagle eds., (1994)).
69. Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
70. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
71. See HOHFELD, supra note 9.
72. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1116 (1998) (“If the relationships between people with respect to an activity are
entirely consensual, privacy may protect them . . . . [but] the right to privacy breaks down when it is
applied to situations involving conflicts within the association.”).
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inherent in the notion of a realm of liberty free from state influence, where some
of the people trapped within that realm have less power than others:
The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specifically regards
himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power
which it allows him to posses over others. This obligation is almost entirely
disregarded in the case of the family relations – a case, in its direct influence on
human happiness, more important than all others taken together.73

And while Mill seems at first focused on parents and children in the here
and now,74 much like Woodhouse, he quickly turns his attention to procreation,
and the prospective children it involves.
It still remains unrecognized that to bring a child into existence without a fair
prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction and
training for its mind is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and
against society. . . . It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced
notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being
recognized, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the
strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also.
The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most
responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility
– to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing – unless the being on
whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable
existence, is a crime against that being.75

But the point here is not to challenge the broad notion of the right to
procreate by critiquing its footing on constitutional precedent or its moral
implications, but to accept it at least for purposes of the claim.
Though as an aside, I imagine it is the notion of the right most people in the
United States would have in mind were they to think about their constitutional
right and any possible state interference with it. And while it is well beyond the
scope of this project, we can speculate how this broad notion of the
constitutional right – which is merely a legal bulwark against state action, may
have influenced the people’s moral view of their liberty to procreate, that is, the
potential absence of any moral duties regarding having children. It seems
possible to imagine that in negating the notion of duties to future children, the
common notion of the constitutional right has simply encouraged what, from an
objective perspective, might be considered irresponsible procreation (i.e.,
procreation in disregard of the interests of future children and those with whom
they will interact).
73. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 103 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859)
(emphasis added).
74.
One would almost think that a man’s children were supposed to be literally, and not
metaphorically, a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law
with his absolute and exclusive control over them, more jealous than of almost any
interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of mankind
value liberty than power.
Id. at 103-04.
75. Id. at 104-06. Mill later refers to the value of social stigma, even in the absence of legal
punishment, for what we must assume he would consider wrongful acts of procreation. Id. at 107.
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B. The Class of Prospective Children
The most important and unfamiliar element to the claim is the class I term
prospective children, who exist temporally somewhere between remote future
generations that will exist, and the more proximate production of specific
gametes for the next generation of children that will be born. The scope of the
class is thus defined by the advent of actual future people (as opposed to merely
possible people)76 on one side, and conception on the other. It includes those
morally, and as will be shown legally, extant persons who will come to exist
physically in the next generations. The temporal focus here will be on what
might be called the family-planning stage, or the anticipation of having
children.77 The concept may seem abstract, but the law often recognizes
temporal classes of persons, be they the dead, elderly, minors, infants, fetuses,
etc. This classification simply goes one step further back (or forward, depending
on one’s perspective) from conception.
The point here will simply be to establish that future persons exist as a
class, both morally and legally, before they exist physically, and that prospective
children make up a logical sub-class of future persons. It will be difficult but
important, for purposes of this analysis, to maintain focus on prospective
children rather than slipping into thinking about living children. Though the
former will eventually become the latter, the classes are distinct.
Before proceeding further with this claim, we should also distinguish it
from the claim that the privacy or liberty-based right to abort one’s fetus also
treats prospective children as property, and is in tension with the Constitution
as such. I will not pursue the issue further here, but will simply say that one
claim does not necessarily lead to the other78 – primarily because it is not clear
that a fetus and prospective abortee is a person, morally and legally, in the same

76. See ROBERTS, supra note 21.
77. For example, ethicists have focused on this temporal stage in the process of having children.
See, e.g., James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 815-16 (1986) (arguing that in the
example of Alma, a fourteen-year-old girl considering having a child, “duties and obligations
constitute[ ] an important reason . . . for Alma not to have a child”). There is a vast body of literature
examining the rights and wrongs of choosing to have a child which often focuses on what has been
called the non-identity or contingent future persons problem, but my claim is distinguishable and is
based on a legal rather than exclusively moral principle.
78. There are three initial difficulties with making the latter claim that one does not encounter
with the former. The first is that it is not clear that the class of future persons I refer to as
prospective children includes fetuses when they are considered as prospective abortees, because at
that point they lack the necessary condition that they will exist in the future. The whole question of
aborting the fetus cuts off the presumption that allows one to consider the future person it would
otherwise become. At that point they are more possible than prospective. As will be discussed,
FDA regulations meant to avoid birth defects are premised on the child being born, not aborted.
Secondly, one of the reasons the broad notion tends to treat people as property, as discussed below,
is that it allows the prospective parent to exclude others’ control in determining the future legal,
moral, and proprietary relations of prospective children. In contrast, abortion negates the future
relations the fetus would have otherwise had. Thirdly, unlike the broad notion of the right to
procreate, the constitutional right to terminate one’s pregnancy seems much more narrow, with the
woman’s privacy or liberty-based right balanced against competing interests and defined by
considerations such as viability and undue burdens. It may be that, ignoring for a moment the first
two difficulties, the right to terminate one’s pregnancy has been tailored to avoid the property
objection.
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way that a future person (who will be born and live in the future) is. To succeed
in using the property objection against the right to terminate one’s pregnancy,
we would have to equate the two. Also, assuming for the sake of argument that
the right to abort one’s fetus were objectionable because it means treating
prospective children as property, perhaps this would explain why abortion
jurisprudence balances the right to abort one’s fetus against the state interest in
the fetus itself.79 But if that were the case, it would be odd to treat the right to
terminate one’s pregnancy as qualified, but the right to procreate as relatively
absolute; doing so would mean that the state is attending more to the interests of
fetuses than the interests of prospective children.
Ironically, it seems likely that many supporters of a broad right to
terminate one’s pregnancy might also, out of a commitment to a liberal
perspective of sorts, oppose the “no procreation” probation order discussed
above. In one sense this is a very “pro life” perspective in that the argument
seems to be that the mere production of human life – regardless of the
circumstances in which it is begun – is desirable. However, this issue is well
beyond the scope of this article.
These issues aside, one obvious counter to the claim that the broad
interpretation of the right treats prospective children as a class of property
would be to challenge whether members of that class are moral or legal agents,
and to argue that if they are not, treating “them” as property would not be
objectionable at all. This is commonly done by those justifying the classification
of animals as property. However, the fact that prospective persons do not exist
physically does not mean than they do not exist morally or legally. In the case
of prospective children, both moral and legal authorities not only presume their
existence but go a step further, recognizing norms that would protect them as
legal and moral agents from people who are alive today.
Aaron Bruhl uses the example of setting a bomb to detonate long into the
future to demonstrate this point:
[W]hat if I instead set the bomb to detonate a couple of hundred years hence,
enough time to ensure that the future victims of my mischief are currently nonexistent? Despite their current anonymity and non-existence, it is nonetheless
living, breathing, interest-bearing persons who stand to suffer from my actions.
Whether the bomb maims people tomorrow or the next century, do we not
explain the wrongness of my act in exactly the same way? In both cases, we
would say that it is for the potential victims’ sake that I ought not plant the
bomb, and it is their due that I refrain.80

The point here is to note the moral and legal duty one would have not to
plant the bomb, which correlates to the rights of future persons not to be harmed
by one bombing them. But there is no need to rely on legal thought-experiments
because the law provides ample evidence of legal duties to future persons and
prospective children. Bruhl uses the example from products liability law of a
79. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-73 (1992) (holding that
states can regulate abortion at the point where the state gains a significant interest in protecting the
life of the fetus).
80. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Note, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 393, 414 (2002).

Dillard_cpcxns.doc

5/5/2010 1:44:16 PM

FUTURE CHILDREN AS PROPERTY

65

car that was manufactured prior to the conception of a child and had flaws that
resulted in the child’s death.81 There is no reason to think that the manufacturer
would not be liable, and that the liability would not be premised on the duty the
manufacturer owed at the time the car was manufactured to future persons,
whether or not they physically exist. The manufacturer owes a duty now to
those who do not yet physically exist – and if he or she did not there would be
no tort liability in the future when the victim is actually harmed. If he or she
owes no duty to the potential victim at the time the car was manufactured, how
could one eventually be liable to them?
These examples rely on traditional notions of harm where the victims are
made worse off than either they were before, or than they otherwise would have
been. But we can also understand harm in terms of putting persons into
particular states of affairs that fall below a certain threshold, or the idea that we
harm people by causing them “to be worse off than they should be.”82 The
argument here would be that prospective parents should not have exclusive
control and use over members of the class of future children, thereby having the
power to assign them to sub-threshold circumstances, e,g. legally unfit
parentage, foster-care, state institutions, etc. But again, as will be discussed
below, one of the merits of the property objection is that it does not have to rely
on the substance of competing notions of harm at all, because the property
objection is more procedural, and regards who determines the future interests of
the class. It objects to exclusive dominion, dominion which negates the interests
of members of the future child class, being given to prospective parents for their
use.
Regardless, there are various other examples of the law protecting classes
of future persons, consistent with the notion of threshold-harm. These include
the FDA’s preventative regulation of drugs or devices that cause birth defects,
the prohibition of incest, the regulation of surrogacy contracts, trust law
protecting unconceived beneficiaries, recent preemptive no-procreation and nocustody probation orders issued against abusive and neglectful parents as in the
case of Bobbijean P, etc. 83 Whether it regulates our use of pharmaceuticals,
prohibits certain consanguineous relationships in order to avoid disabilities in
future generations, provides legal instruments to protect the assets of future
children, or prohibits parents likely to abuse and neglect future children from
having access to them, our law seems to presume that a class of future legal and
moral agents exists – and that we have duties to its members well before they
physically exist.
Consider for example laws that regulate adoption.84 The prospective
adoptive parents are subject to rigorous examination by the state in the interests
of protecting the child they will have, often before that child is born. The law
81. Id. at 414-15.
82. See Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY §
3.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justiceintergenerational/; Jeff McMahan, Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist, in
RATIONAL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS FOR GREGORY KAVKA 209 (Jules L. Coleman and
Christopher W. Morris eds., 1998).
83. See Dillard, supra note 13, at 388-97.
84. Id. at 388-89.
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here recognizes the interests of the prospective child and protects those interests
by assuring that the adoptive parents meet the relevant statutory standard.
If civil or common law presumes the class of prospective children exists
morally and legally, is it possible that the Constitution excludes the class from
consideration in substantive due process analysis? Perhaps the best evidence
that it does not is the Court’s decision in Buck, cited with approval in Roe v.
Wade,85 which explicitly recognized and based its decision in part on the
interests of Carrie Buck’s future children.86 Whatever went wrong with the final
decision in Buck after that does not change the legal recognition of the class,
which is key to its holding.
Why are prospective children considered as a class, rather than as
individuals? While we know that parents are likely to have children with
sufficient characteristics to give them moral and legal personhood (sentience,
reason, etc.), we cannot conceive of what a particular future person or
prospective child is like.
And as one commentator put it, “[b]ecause
conventional analysis [like that employed in wrongful life cases] looks only for
individual victims, it ignores the harm that can be inflicted on future children as
a class when irresponsible reproductive choices are made.”87 But not being able
to conceive of particular persons does not matter for our purposes of conceiving
of the class, morally or legally. “One fact about future people is that we do not
know who exactly they will be. But surely this is not the problem. . . . Standard
duties to take reasonable care correlate with rights even though the identity of
the right-holder might be unknown at the time of acting.”88
In terms of moral argument, it is safe to say that the academy has moved
past the fact that prospective children do not physically exist, and now focuses
on how to characterize the wrongs we can do to them.89 Characterizations of
wrongness aside, the ontology of the class is not really debated by philosophers
nor, as shown above, by the law. Moreover, while there is moral and legal

85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that a statute prohibiting abortion was a
violation of due process rights); see also In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Neb. 1968) (citing Buck in
upholding a compulsory sterilization statute for institutionalized mental patients), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Cavitt v. Nebraska, 396 U.S. 996 (1970); In re Sterilization of Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 313 (N.C.
1976) (citing Buck in upholding a statute authorizing compulsory sterilization of the mentally ill).
86. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a statute which required compulsory
sterilization of inmates of state institutions who suffer from insanity or mental defects).
87. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to the Children of Reproductive
Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 376 (1999); see also Michael Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 292, 300 (1976).
88. Bruhl, supra note 80, at 413.
89. See, e.g., Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 6 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2007/entries/justice-intergenerational (concluding that rights should be attributed to future
persons with corresponding duties owed by present generations). Meyer states that “considerations
based upon the rights of future people can guide prospective parents in deciding whether they
should revise their decision to conceive out of regard for the children they would otherwise have.”
Id. See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 63, 65 (1974) (quoting Coke: “The law in many cases hath consideration
of him in respect of the apparent expectation of his birth . . . .”; and commenting “Why then deny
that the human beings of the future have rights which can be claimed against us now in their
behalf?”).
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authority presuming the existence of prospective children, we can also deduce
their existence logically. If we feel a moral resistance to intentionally taking a
drug that will cause birth defects in any children we have, or to having a child
when we lack any means to support it, what is presently causing that resistance?
These persons, and prospective children, do not physically exist, yet morality,
and in some cases the law, constrains our current behavior in protecting their
interests.
C. Notions of Property
1. Traditional notion of property
One traditional notion of property (or rather private property) seems to
entail this at its core: the excluding of others (or the individualizing of control) to
allow use of the thing one has property in.90 Property, and this notion of it, is
not a binary concept. There are degrees to which one can assert, and the law can
enforce, the exclusion of others from control of property. One can imagine a
spectrum of exclusion that corresponds directly to one’s property interest. Of
course, at some point others may participate in the control of use to such a
degree that it no longer makes sense to refer to the object, or class of objects, as
belonging to the original proprietor.
This notion of property – with its singular focus on the owner and the
object – may seem too simplistic when compared to the more familiar image of a
complex bundle of rights or “sticks,” which represent the owner’s relations to
others regarding the object, and which all must be considered (including
excludability) in sum to determine whether one has property in something or
not.91 However, there are three reasons, for purposes of this article, to focus on
property as the exclusion of others to allow use.
First, it is very possible that exclusion is a necessary condition and sine qua
non of any concept of property,92 or at the very least is “one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”93
90. See, e.g., Gregory C. Alexander, et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 743-44 (2009) (describing the “common conception of property as protection of individual
control over valuable resources . . . [s]ometimes the expression of this idea focuses on the right to
exclude others and sometimes on the free use of what one owns.”); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap:
The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL. L. REV. 959, 988
(2009) (describing the core of property as exclusion); Jeremy Waldron, Property, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2008), available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/#1 (describing private property as entailing exclusive control,
so that “[i]n general the right of a proprietor to decide as she pleases about the resource that she
owns applies whether or not others are affected by her decision”).
91. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (holding that deprivation of one aspect of one’s
property right does not itself constitute a taking).
92. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 752 (1998); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (the right to exclude is “universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right”).
93. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); see also
Sankoorikal, supra note 25 at 589 (under “the ‘bundle of rights’ framework, the hallmarks of a
property right include the ability to control something and the ability to prevent others from
interfering with that control”).
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As the Court said recently, the “hallmark of a protected property interest is the
right to exclude others.”94 For example, if we say that property is really about
market-alienability, it may be that the concept of market-alienability
presupposes my right to exclude others from also simultaneously selling the res,
the bridge for example, that I am trying to sell. It is hard to think of a property
right that does not first require our excluding others from controlling and using
that which we claim property in.
Secondly, if we divide the Constitution into various sections where the
concept of property is at issue, it may be that exclusion is the defining element
when looking at property in the context of substantive due process. Thomas
Merrill has examined the various notions of property used by the Court in its
constitutional jurisprudence, and while Merrill has advocated for using a
concept (or “patterning definition”) of property-as-wealth in this context, he
finds that the Supreme Court has held that “property for purposes of the Due
Process Clause includes as an essential element the right to exclude others.”95 In
the context of interpreting Reconstruction Era amendments, it may make sense
to at least focus on that element of property that is not only fundamental to the
constitutional definition but appropriate, in the Court’s eyes, to this particular
context.
Thirdly, and most importantly, when looking at the concept of property as
it relates to one class of persons owning another, perhaps we should use a
concept of property that focuses less on the complex relations with other
persons that the bundled property right entails, and more on the exclusion – or
exercise of dominion – that the owner exercises not just with regard to others,
but specifically with regard to what are the objectified persons in whom he or
she has property. This point was made eloquently by Jeanne Schroeder in her
critique of a particular historiography of legal literature regarding slavery, and
without analogizing prospective children to slaves because I believe it would be
morally questionable and inaccurate to do so, Schroeder’s point helps clarify not
just the concept of property, but of property in persons.
2. People as property
In 1996 Thomas Russell wrote a revisionist history of slavery, applying
Hohfeld’s property theory, in lieu of William Blackstone’s, to the institution of
slavery in the antebellum South. In essence, Russell argued that Blackstone’s
theory leads one to erroneously focus on the relationship between slave-owner

94. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999).
95. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 970 (2000);
see also id. at 983, 985-86.
College Savings Bank holds that a statutory cause of action for false advertising by a
competitor does not implicate any substantive due process property. Justice Scalia
explained that this is because such a cause of action does not itself entail any right to
exclude others, nor does the underlying activity protected by the cause of action--the right
to compete for future customers and revenues--entail a right to exclude others.
Id. at 985 (footnotes omitted) (that case involved the question of whether a due process right was
implicated, and as such, whether the Eleventh Amendment immunity applied to protect the state
from a federal false adverting cause of action).
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and slave as one of absolute dominion by one person over an inanimate object,
or res. Russell argued that instead, the relationship should be thought of as a
bundle of rights, shared by various persons, who each have a share, or interest,
that regards the slave.96 He argued that Hohfeld’s theory of multiple interests,
or the familiar “bundle of sticks,” accurately describes the historical property
interests that existed in the institution of slavery.
Russell was critiqued by Jeanne Schroeder, who rejects Hohfeld’s property
theory, though not his classification of non-property rights.97 Without doing
justice to the argument, Schroeder claimed that Blackstone properly accounted
for the fact that property rights are relations between subjects with regard to an
object (or res). Further she argued that Hohfeld’s approach fails by not doing so,
for at least two reasons. Schroeder claimed that Hohfeld started from the
“naive, but common, assumption that only tangible, physical things can be
‘objects.’ . . . [H]e thought that the object of property relations could only be
Blackacre [the standard reference for theoretical real estate] itself, and not the
estates in Blackacre. In Lacanian terminology, this is an Imaginary conflation of
the Symbolic with the Real—a basic psychoanalytic tendency.”98
Secondly, “Hohfeld thought that the only way to reconcile the fact that the
law recognizes property rights [e.g., patents and copyrights] with his
assumptions that only tangible things could be objects, was to deny that
property claims involved objects at all.”99 Schroeder rejected Hohfeld’s failure
to recognize property in a slave, because property in another person can be
thought of simply as their legal reconstruction as an object or res, which
destroys that person’s subjectivity. To Schroeder, using Hohfeld’s view of
property means the slave did not legally exist at all (or became a “ghost,” as she
put it), whereas Blackstone’s view accurately captured what it meant to have
property in another. “The Blackstonian lawyer at least confronts the slave as an
object to which she does not have a relationship. The Hohfeldian lawyer never
has to confront the existence of the slave at all because she disappears even as an
object.”100
Using the basic notion of property described above, Hohfeld’s classification
of rights, and Schroeder’s point about what it means to have property in others,
we can say that property in others (even intangible others, like prospective
children), which can be a matter of degree, is the excluding of others’ control (or
96. See Thomas D. Russell, A New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of the
Law in Slave Sales and a Conceptual Reevaluation of the Nature of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473,
520 (1996).
97. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Hegel's Slaves, Blackstone's Objects, and Hohfeld's Ghosts: A Comment
on Thomas Russell's Imagery of Slave Auctions, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 528 (1996).
98. Id. at 529 (citations omitted). “For example, when I eat an apple, my sensuous experience of
holding, chewing, and digesting the apple does not make it the object of a property right--it only
becomes an object or res through the application of law when I assert the right to possess, enjoy, and
alienate the apple.” Id. at 530.
99. Id. Schroeder proposes instead what she calls a Lacanian-Hegelian approach. She explains
Hegel’s philosophy in which persons desperately seek to be recognized as subjects by one another
by using neutral objects, such as property, to mediate their relationships. Id. at 531-33. This has real
implications for the claim in this article, in terms of the role prospective children play in
relationships, which will not be pursued here.
100. Id. at 528.
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“power” in Hohfeld’s terminology) in favor of one’s own power to allow use,
and furthermore that it is a legal reconstruction of the person as an object or res
so as to destroy the person’s subjectivity. As such, property rights do not tend
to exclude only power by others around the object but also power (or self-use)
by the object itself. This power allows the proprietor (or class of proprietors) to
give himself liberties that correlate with a lack of duties to others regarding the
object as well as a lack of duties to the object (or class of objects) itself, as well as
the claim-rights to prevent others or the object from interfering with the
excluding use. It also allows the proprietor to determine which liberties and
claim-rights the object enjoys with regard to others, as well the object’s own
proprietary relations – determining in what the object can and cannot have
property.
D. The Power of Procreating
Power-rights (or power) in the Hohfeldian scheme of rights involve the
“right” to determine another’s future liberties, duties, claim-rights, etc. For
example, we can imagine the power a ship’s captain may have in the future to
deny a sailor the liberty to go ashore, by creating a duty for him or her to stay
aboard. The key is the ability to create future liberties, duties, claim-rights, etc.
for others. For Hohfeld, a power is “an ability to cause, by an act of one’s own,
an alteration in a person’s rights, either one’s own rights or those of another
person or persons, or both.”101 Consistent with this definition, the very act of
procreating allows prospective parents to determine future legal and moral
relations, including relations in property, for members of the class of prospective
children. That is, each person born into a particular state of legal, moral, and
proprietary relations was once a member of the prospective child class.
For example, in the United States, if a pregnant woman chooses to conceive
and bear a child while taking thalidomide, and that child is born disabled, he or
she will have certain disability-related legal liberties, claim-rights, powers, etc.
under a variety of state and federal laws. However, had the pregnant woman
chosen instead to conceive and bear a child at some other point in time, while
not taking thalidomide, and her child was not born disabled, these liberties and
rights would of course not be owed to the non-disabled child. Before
procreation, no member of the class of her prospective children was in either of
the two specific legal positions, though all are members of a class that we know
exists because we owe them some moral and legal obligations as described
above. But by procreating, the prospective parent creates legal relations for
what was, in the past, one member of the class. The prospective parent literally
plucks a member of the prospective child class out of the world of a number of
potential relations and actualizes that former member of the class in a world of
relatively fixed relations.
These then are the legal incidents of procreation: creating legal relations
with others, legal relations in property, and of course, moral relations, for a class
of morally and legally relevant persons. The thalidomide example may seem a
bit far-fetched, but every prospective parent, in the act of having a child, moves

101. THOMSON, supra note 9.

Dillard_cpcxns.doc

5/5/2010 1:44:16 PM

FUTURE CHILDREN AS PROPERTY

71

a member of the prospective child class from a world of many potential relations
into a world of relatively fixed relations. If you were to choose to have a child in
circumstances A, say a community that owed the legal duty (through
constitution or statute) of a high-level of education to children in its jurisdiction,
as opposed to circumstances B where no such duty existed, or the level of
education owed was very low, you will have taken a child out of the class of
prospective children and given them a particular legal claim (that which exists
in A) that the alternative child would not have had (were they born into B). By
procreating you determine and fix the future legal relations of members of the
class.
Of course, procreating also determines the moral relations of members of
the class. You might choose to have a child in a community or extended family
that feels a moral duty to help care for and raise all of its young, in a community
that largely ignores them, or in a place where at least some of the others around
you feel themselves at liberty to prey on the child.
The point is simple but not obvious. By procreating we determine the
initial full quantum of legal and moral relations for a member of a class of
persons. We take members of that class from a neutral baseline and define their
initial state of affairs. We may be able to make them exist where there are little
or no resources to ensure the child’s development, make them exist in an
abusive home, make them exist in a place where we ourselves wished we were
not, or make them exist in a loving home full of relative opportunity. The
members of the class are called from it, and actualized by us at will.
E. Prospective Children as Property
With these concepts of the broad right to procreate, the class of prospective
children, and property in others in mind, as well as the premise that procreating
allows prospective parents to create future relations for prospective children, we
can assess whether under the broad right these children are treated as property.
Recall Tribe’s broad notion of the right: “whether one person’s body shall be the
source of another life must be left to that person and that person alone to decide.”102 Per
Roberts, Robertson, and many others, procreation is part of the right to (or realm
of) privacy, walled off from the state. It is an act of self-determination that
should be informed only by one’s free will. It is the realm that in Hohfeld’s
terms represents for the procreator a liberty to have children (or a lack of duty
not to procreate), a claim-right to the constitutional duty the state owes not to
interfere with our having children, as well as a constitutional immunity from the
state altering the liberty or claim-right. Because procreation is self-determining,
our free will to procreate takes primacy when conflicts with other rights or
interests arise, irrespective of the method for having children, the circumstances
in which we have them, and the number we wish to have.
But is there something odd about this notion of the right? When the
Eisenstadt Court refers to the right to be free from unwarranted intrusion into
matters “so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or

102. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 1340.
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beget a child,”103 who is the person it refers to? It is in fact considering the
prospective parent’s interests in non-interference, and not those of the person
most affected, the prospective child. Although, the prospective child is implicit
in “the decision whether to bear or beget a child,” it is nevertheless invisible (or
ghost-like to use Schroeder’s analogy), which is perhaps because while it exists
morally and legally, it does not yet exist physically. Perhaps the Court does not
see it because it is subsumed by the prospective parents’ subjectivity.
As discussed above, the prospective child does exist morally and legally,
but without physical form the Court has not seen it, so that it is left trapped
within the realm of procreative rights, made liable to the power the Court gives
parents along with the liberty, claim-right, and immunity to procreate at will
and to determine its future relations.104
This notion of the right to procreate treats prospective children as property
because it excludes others’ power over members of that class, including any
constructive power members might have over themselves, and allows parents
free use of the class. Like a property owner, or one who owns property in
another, a prospective parent is given relatively absolute and undivided power
to determine the legal and moral relations that a member of the prospective
child class will come to have. By deciding where and when to pluck them out of
the class by procreating, the prospective parent or parents alone will decide – in
the process of excluding others and the constructive interests of members of that
class – what these persons shall have as their initial birthrights. There is thus a
direct relationship between the degree of privacy the right assures and the
degree of property interest it awards – this is the core of the property objection.
The privacy-right objectifies members of the prospective child class,
substituting the prospective parents’ subjectivity for that of the class. Who here
represents their interests? No one, because as objects members of the class have
no interests to represent – at least none that are not fully accounted for by the
prospective parents’ subjectivity.
In this version of the right, no objective standards represent the interests of
the class of future children. As in the case of In re. Bobbijean P,105 the prospective
parents are guaranteed the right to pull as many children from the class and to
place them in any circumstances they wish because the children are determined
to have no interests – are left as objects – until they take physical form. At that
point the state will seize them, but not before the parents have determined at
least their initial legal and moral relations, and indentured them in foster care or
an institution as wards of the state.
If we were to leave the future interests of living children exclusively to the
will of their parents we would have no problem in seeing that they are treated as
property. But our laws prevent this, and qualify parental rights with public

103. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
104. This discussion focuses on the power over prospective children that is incident to the right,
but note the liberties, claim-rights, and powers the right entails for others as well. Prospective
parents have the power to create legal duties in others with regard to the child, the right to claim
those persons duty not to interfere in the process, and the lack of any duty to not do so.
105. 842 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (App. Div. 2007).
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objective standards that limit their use of children and that represent the
children’s future interests. Doing so “frees” the child. But we have no
comparable public objective standards that seem to represent the interests of the
class of future children today.
Moreover, the point of making procreation private is not exclusion for its
own sake (whatever pleasure one might find in simply keeping others away and
nothing more), but to allow prospective parents the benefit of free use of
members of the class. The private realm of the right prevents others from
interfering with our free access to and use of these children, to actualize them at
will, because, for example, we may at that time want a child of a certain gender,
or a certain number of children, or because we want them to have a certain
genotype, or because our parents wish us to have children sooner than later, or
because we think having children may save a failing marriage, or so that we
may have an infant to dote upon, or to benefit from his or her eventual labor, or
because we wish to express our virility, or because we wish to genetically design
our offspring, or because we want the numbers of our race or nation to grow.
All of these are protected uses under the broad notion of the right.
But does the broad notion of the right really meet Schroeder’s final criteria,
of destroying prospective children’s subjectivity, excluding not just the control
of others, but excluding power and control (or self-use) by prospective children
themselves? Can they – who do not physically exist – have subjectivity, or selfuse, in any meaningful way? Is there any way of constructing an alternative
right concerning the unique act of creating another that does not have the same
result? Must all prospective children have a guardian ad litem to give the child’s
constructive or representative consent to being born? Again, this article is
primarily a critique of the broad notion rather than a prescription for an
alternative view of the right. But as these questions suggest, an alternative right
would need to account for many things that the broad notion neatly ignores.
Perhaps we can at least say that the opposite of a private realm protecting
the exclusive use and control of other persons is a right based on public norms,
or what might be called a public right – not in the sense of a collective or group
right – but in the sense of a right the scope of which is limited by public (or
objective) norms rather than private (or subjective) ones. These norms might
constructively represent the interests of the prospective child class, because
while we cannot directly survey its members to determine their interests, we
may be able to divine the norms from the interests of persons alive today. And
we may also at least say that the opposite of free use of prospective children is
the application of norms which prohibit free use. Again, such norms might not
only represent the power of existing persons (other than the prospective
parents) over the class of prospective children, but also be representative of the
interests of the class itself, its members being part of the public morally and
legally, if not physically.
Such a new notion of the right, defined by such norms, would be less
proprietary to the extent that it de-objectifies prospective children and provides
them with constructive subjectivity – changing them from the ghosts they seem
to be in the Eisenstadt notion into persons with interests. We “free” members of
the class by imbuing them with some constructive interests that limit our use of
them.
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And this would bring us full-circle back to Mill’s rather utilitarian point,
that it is not inconsistent with liberty, but is in fact autonomy-maximizing, for
the state to maintain “vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it
allows [one] to posses over others.” His point, like Woodhouse’s, is that
extending zones of liberty in some cases – as in a family – can act much like a
see-saw, ensuring that freedom within that zone rises for some while it falls for
others. Or as I have argued here, because of the unique nature of the act of
procreating, the liberty and privacy-based right we extend to prospective
parents is converted into a property right in members of the class of their
prospective children. Any less proprietary right to procreate would have to at
least mitigate this result.
III. ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE
This Part is only a brief and incomplete survey of some of the alternative
ways of conceiving of the right to procreate. This article has instead focused on
critiquing the broad notion because, logically, one would need to show that the
accepted version of the right should be rejected before coming up with a different
notion. But it might be worth closing that discussion by showing that some
alternative notions at least exist, which are both externally and internally more
limited than the broad notion, 106 though the work here seems to be done
primarily by moral rather than legal theorists. These notions differ from the
broad notion articulated by Tribe and others in that they tend to treat
prospective children less as property because they mitigate prospective parents’
power over members of that class, tempering it against norms that influence the
future legal and moral relations of prospective children.
For example, Carl Wellman has analyzed the development of the
constitutional right to procreate from Meyer through its transformation into a
privacy or liberty right in the modern substantive due process cases.107
Wellman, like Tribe and others, argues that the right ought to be conceived of as
a broad privacy-based right, but would limit it by pegging it to specific legal and
social traditions from which the Court first derived the right, and which would
ensure some boundaries on the scope that the right would not otherwise have.108
For example, he would limit the right to procreate to “permit and protect the
liberty of married individuals to make and act on any and all procreational
decisions under normal circumstances,” with such right being overridden when
necessary for some compelling state interest.109
Thus the right Wellman proposes is limited to married couples (which was
a qualification on the right the Skinner court had implied as well),110 confined as
such to a tradition and institution that Wellman argues was historically
designed in part to protect children’s interests (i.e. by ensuring inheritance,

106. This article will not discuss the issue of when external limits define a liberty interest or
fundamental right per se, and when they simply appear on the other side of the scale, counted only
towards a state’s legitimate or compelling interests.
107. See WELLMAN, supra note 62, at 120-35.
108. Id. at 120-23, 134.
109. Id. at 145-46.
110. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537, 541.
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preventing incest, creating family stability, etc.); the right to marry would thus
determine the contours of the right to procreate, limiting the right for persons
who are too young to marry, married to another, lacking sufficient reason to
enter the marriage contract, persons related by blood, etc. By pegging
procreation to marriage, Wellman offers a different right from the broad notion
discussed above, that is, a right of limited access to the prospective child class.
Under it, prospective parents cannot fully exclude others’ power (including
norms that might represent the constructive power of members of the class
itself) to determine the future relations of members of the class, because the
prospective parent has no liberty, claim-right, or immunity absent the necessary
condition of marriage.
Maura Ryan offers a different notion of the right.111 In Ryan’s model,
“[i]ndividual rights, therefore, are relative (modified by commitments to the
common life) and reciprocal (they arise in a social field involving correlative
duties and counterclaims).”112
For Ryan, “‘having children’ is
phenomenologically equivalent to ‘being a parent,’ much as having true friends
is experienced as being a friend, or having a lover involves loving.”113 Ryan
argues, that “Robertson’s account illustrates what is wrong with the liberal
conception of reproductive rights.”114 “The concepts of right and entitlement
used by Robertson correspond to the values preserved in traditional notions of
patriarchal fathering—that is, proprietary control and ownership over wives
and children—rather than those of care and responsibility associated with
mothering.”115 For Ryan, 116 “[r]eproduction is inherently relational, ‘otherregarding,’ not just in a physical sense but a moral sense.”117 This relational
account of rights might mean that, rather than Tribe’s argument that it be left to
the prospective parent alone to decide the circumstances in which to procreate,
instead some minimum threshold requirement might be read into the right to
represent the interests of the prospective child class and make it other-regarding
vis-à-vis their interests.
Reinterpreting the Meyer line of authority, Elizabeth S. Scott has argued
that the right to procreate protected by the Constitution is “the right to produce
one’s own children to rear.”118 “The right presumes and indeed requires an
intention as well as an ability to assume the role of parent.”119 For Scott, any
individual who lacks the capability to care for a child has no fundamental right
to procreate.120
This less exclusive and less proprietary notion of the right, in which some
threshold of intent and ability to rear is a necessary condition for the right to
111. MAURA A. RYAN, THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 91-121 (2001).
112. Id. at 109.
113. Id. at 96-97.
114. Id. at 93.
115. Id. at 100.
116. Id. at 104.
117. Id. at 111.
118. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family
Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 829 (1986).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 831.
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obtain, has been proposed in many forms, by theorists such as Michael Bayles,
Onora O’Neill, and David Archard.121 All would force prospective parents to
share their power over the class, limiting their exclusive use of the class. Under
these notions of the right they would not hold an exclusive power to pluck
prospective children out of their potentiality.
Are these narrower notions of the right limited to moral theory or do they
exist in positive law? One area of the law where the broad notion of the right
seems increasingly less accurate involves temporary “no procreation” probation
orders which are issued, and upheld against constitutional challenge in some
cases, when parents have been adjudged criminally unfit to parent (because of a
prior finding of abuse or neglect), and would otherwise have any new children
placed in state custody as such.122 The concept here is simple: if parents are
under a legal duty to be fit in order to have custody of children, absent
acceptable alternative custody arrangements, there is no principled argument
for not finding prospective parents to be under the same duty.123 The latter is
simply the same rule applied ex ante rather than ex post. Could the same
approach apply in international law as well? In light of the internal logic of the
Children’s Rights Convention, and its goal of preventing children from living in
certain sub-standard conditions, there are reasons to think so.124
These forms of the right – setting a minimum threshold before prospective
parents may procreate or tying the right to the constructive interests of the
prospective child – can be thought of as externally limiting. The forms reflect
public norms (i.e. norms based on interests other than those of the prospective
parent) regarding what prospective children deserve, and through those norms
narrow, from the outside in, the realm in which prospective parents can exclude
others in determining the fate of prospective children.
But there are also ways of thinking about the right that seem to limit it from
the inside out, that is, narrow the right based upon the limited interests of the
right-holders, the prospective parents themselves.125 There are at least three
specific and integral presumptions on which the broad notion of the right to

121. See Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25, 25-26 (Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979) (“The
right to beget or bear is not unrestricted, but contingent upon begetters and bearers having or
making some feasible plan for their child to be adequately reared by themselves or by willing
others.”); Bayles, supra note 87, at 302 (“There is a good reason for legislation to prevent the birth of
persons who would lack substantial capacity to achieve or take advantage of a quality of life of level
n or whose existence would decrease the number of people who might live with a quality of life at
that level.”); David Archard, Wrongful Life, 79 PHILOSOPHY 403, 420 (2004) (“[T]he minimum
threshold entitlement of any child is the secure enjoyment of a good number of those rights that are
listed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This is every child’s birthright.”).
122. See generally Dillard, supra note 57.
123. Id.
124. See generally Carter Dillard, Prospective Parents and the Children’s Rights Convention, 25 AM. U.
INT.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421566.
125. Robertson has discussed limiting the scope of activity which procreative liberty protects, a
limitation he calls an “internal constraint,” to the production of genetically related offspring in the
next generation. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted
Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 21 nn.66-67 (2004).
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procreate rests, and internal limits to the right seem to appear as we question
those presumptions.
First, the broad notion of the right to procreate or not procreate is not
simply a creation of modern substantive due process, but is also an application
of the choice or will-based rights model, a historic and controversial basic
understanding of rights that is often contrasted with the interest-based method
of deriving specific rights. The choice theory holds that moral rights analysis
begins with the “idea of the individual’s sovereignty within the relevant section
of his moral world.”126 Under this model, the core interest is autonomy in
choosing the way to behave, irrespective of the particular conduct at issue. In
contrast, the interest-based view holds that “a person may be said to have a
right if and only if some aspect of her well-being (some interest of hers) is
sufficiently important in itself to justify holding some other person or persons to
be under a duty.”127 The former view assumes that freedom of choice is the core
value, e.g. whether or not to have a child, and leaves it to others to justify
interfering with that choice; the latter places the onus on the right-claimant to
justify non-interference based on the nature of the conduct he or she wishes to
engage in. If we eschew the choice-based theory of rights underlying the broad
notion in favor of the interest-based approach, the broad notion begins to make
little sense. How can a woman simultaneously have an interest, and have her
well-being served, by both having and not having a child?
Secondly, the broad notion seems desirable because it appears to maximize
freedom or autonomy by letting prospective parents do whatever they wish or
prefer to do. But that buys into a version of autonomy that may not be
supportable. Joseph Raz has argued that “[a]utonomy is valuable only if
exercised in pursuit of the good,”128 and his richly complex version of
perfectionist liberalism (in which freedom is the presence of objectively valuable
opportunities in life)129 leads to doubts about the value of a right to procreate
which permits one to use prospective children for any purpose imaginable. For
example, a criminally unfit prospective parent may reduce their own autonomy
126. Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural Rights Derive From Natural Law, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
695, 699 (1997) (quoting RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 6-7 (1973)). Further, “[i]t will
also tend as a consequence to stress the importance of the individual’s own capacity to make moral
choices, that is to say, his liberty. If active [or choice-based] rights are paradigmatic, then to attribute
rights to someone is to attribute some kind of liberty to them.” Id. at 699.
The moral justification [for the right] does not arise from the character of the particular
action to the performance of which the claimant has a right; what justifies the claim is
simply—there being no special relation between him and those who are threatening to
interfere to justify that interference—that this is a particular exemplification of the equal
right to be free.
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in JEREMY WALDRON, Introduction, THEORIES OF RIGHTS
87-88 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
127. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 504 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (1986) (“Assertions of rights are typically intermediate
conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties”).
128. RAZ, supra note 127, at 381; see also Leslie Green, Un-American Liberalism: Raz’s ‘Morality of
Freedom,’ 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 317, 324 (1988) (“The autonomous life attains significance in the context
of moral pluralism.”).
129. For a thorough discussion and critique of Raz’s theory see Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and
Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097 (1989).
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by having children they cannot care for, because as parents they may be
punished for neglecting their children. Furthermore, prospective children who
will be born into a neglectful state of affairs, and moved into state custody as
such, are destined for a world that is not particularly free and full of objectively
valuable opportunities.
Thirdly, the broad notion seems to ignore (perhaps because of its choicebased premises) an internal limit that may be inherent in the very interest we as
humans have in procreating. When, if at all, does the value of procreating
become sated?130 Legal and moral theorists focused on the right to procreate
admit that the particular interests at issue are satiable (or diminishing),131 but the
broad notion ignores this, protecting each act anew and disregarding that the
right-holder’s interests may have already been sated. It not only guarantees
prospective parents excluding control over the future of their prospective
children, it permits prospective parents to pluck as many children out of the
class as they wish. It is beyond the scope of this critique of the broad notion of
the right, but it may be that the only logical and non-arbitrary point at which to
claim the interest is when one has procreated, and moved from the position of
one who has not self-replaced to the position of one who has.132 This particular
approach to the right would have implications for substantive due process
analysis, leading courts to shift from a fundamental rights test to the less
burdensome protected liberty test depending on the number of children the
parents had already had.
Considering all of these alternatives to Tribe’s approach, we may begin to
see a unified alternative notion of the right to procreate that might replace the
common liberty and privacy-based notion as primarily defined, or hemmed in,
by the concepts of threshold and satiability. Note that the concepts of threshold
and satiability are themselves somewhat related, as the resources available to
children for their well-being, including material resources like food, clothing,
and shelter, as well as time, affection, and instruction, are divided by the
number of children that compete for them. But it is crucial to see that these
alternative notions of the right, whether narrower than the broad right because
of external norms or internal limits, are all much less proprietary than the broad
conception because they mitigate the power or control of prospective parents to
allow use of members of the prospective child class, in some cases balancing the
power against norms that represent the interests of prospective children
themselves.

130. For a discussion of satiable interests and goods, see IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM 75
(1999) (finding that a satiable good is “a good the conditions for the existence of which can be wholly
satisfied. The most obvious examples are physiological needs, such as the relief of hunger.”).
131. See ROBERTSON, supra note 65, at 31, 70 (noting that overpopulation, unfit parents, and high
medical or social costs may sate the value of reproduction); Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children:
Parental Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 380 (2005); Daniel Statman, The Right to
Parenthood: An Argument for a Narrow Interpretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 225-26 (2003) (arguing
that the desire to have children can be sated by adoption and ART, and that a parent’s general
interest in reproduction is often diminished after having two or three offspring).
132. See Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. (forthcoming, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421552.
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How might a state begin to replace the broad privacy-based notion of the
right with more nuanced versions like these? Again, this is beyond the scope of
this piece, but in light of the culturally and politically entrenched nature of the
privacy-right, a “soft law” approach might be preferable. 133 Were the state to
simply begin to express a more nuanced version of the right with, for example, a
“no procreation” order with no attendant enforcement mechanisms (but the
sigma that order might increasingly begin to carry) or through a reordering of
tax benefits and costs, all done as a reasonable appeal to protecting the interests
of future children, the state might start to shift the norm.
CONCLUSION
This brief and exploratory article has mostly been an exposition of the
broad notion of the right to procreate, the privacy or liberty right, which left
without further definition has the rather illiberal consequence of tending to treat
a class of persons, albeit future persons, as property. The broad notion of the
right is thus unsound, drawing curtains of liberty and privacy around
prospective parents and procreators to be, as if a third person were not trapped
between and made subject to them.
This notion leads its proponents into the pitfalls Mill tried to point out
when he wrote On Liberty some one-hundred and fifty years ago. There are of
course alternative notions of the right to procreate, notions which the Court after
Skinner and Buck might have turned to in order to define the fundamental
constitutional right, instead of deriving it from, and making it part of, a broader
realm of family privacy and personal liberty that was itself drawn from a
tradition of fathers treating existing children as property. But despite the
intervening years of substantive due process protecting the right not to
procreate, faced with an optimal case the Court still has room to temper the
broad notion of the right to procreate, and to craft a right that incorporates
internal and external limits which reflect norms protective of the many interests
that procreation involves, and that would be less in tension with a principle
deeply embedded in the Constitution and integral to any concept of liberalism.

133. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (2000) (“My concern in this Article is with the ‘sticky norms problem.’ This
problem occurs when the prevalence of a social norm makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a
law intended to change that norm. . . . Some might conclude from the ‘sticky norms problem’ that
the law is a relatively ineffective instrument for changing norms. . . . In short, norms stick when
lawmakers try to change them with ‘hard shoves’ but yield when lawmakers apply ‘gentle
nudges.’”).

